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DOES THE DEATH OF AN OFFEROR NULLIFY HIS
OFFER?
By MERTON L. FERSON*
rE death of the promisor, before the offer is acted upon, is a
revocation of the offer."' This oft-repeated statement is
sometimes made with bland assurance that it is a necessary corol-
lary of the rule that it requires a "meeting of minds" to make a
contract. 2 Other times the proposition seems to stand upon
reasoning to this effect: The offeror could when living (by giving
notice) revoke his offer; the dead offeror is unable to act;
therefore, the offer is revoked.3
In most cases where the death of an offeror occurs, that faci
may be deemed to revoke the offer without much, if any, injustice
resulting. Some cases, however, present situations in which it
*Dean of the School of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill,. N. C.
lPratt v. Trustees of Baptist Society, (1879) 93 Ill. 475, 34 Am.
Rep. 187.
2"The continuation of an offer is in the nature of its constant repeti-
ion, which necessarily requires someone capable of making a repetition.
Obviously this can no more be done by a dead man than a contract can,
in the first instance, one made by a dead man." Pratt v. Trustees of
Baptist Society, (1879) 93 Ill. 475, 34 Am. Rep. 187.3 Jordan v. Dobbins, (1877) 122 Mass. 168; Aitken v. Lang, (1899) 106
Ky. 652, 51 S. W. 154. "Death terminates the power of the deceased to
act and revokes any authority or license he may have given if it has not
been executed or acted upon:' Aitkin v. Lang, (1899) 106 Ky. 652, 51 S.
W. 154. Professor Parks in a well written article advances the idea that there
is an implied term in every offer to the effect that it will lapse at the of-
feror's death. 23 Mich. L. Rev. 475. This seems, at least, a more rational
explanation of the unfortunate rule than it is to call the offeror's death a
"revocation." The essence of a revocation is notice to the offeree. "An
uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes, and in point of
law, no revocation at all." Stevenson v. McLean, (1880) L. R. 5 Q. B. 346.
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produces shocking hardships to the offerees to hold that death of
the offerors, unknown to the offerees, has terminated the offers.
Suppose such a case as this: A said to B, "I request you to
furnish goods to X tomorrow morning to the value of $100, and
in consideration of your doing so I will pay you." A dies before
morning; but B, unaware of*the death, transfers the goods to X.
Has B a contract claim against A's estate? Some courts have
smugly answered to the effect that the death of an offeror revokes
the offer and denied to B any contract claim.4 Other courts have
balked when the proposition was heading them toward such an
unfair result. 5 One's faith in the common law leads him to ques-
tion a principle which leads to injustice, particularly when a sub-
stantial number of courts refuse to follow it.
The explanation of the proposition generally runs something
like this:
"This event (death of offeror) is in itself a revocation as ir
makes the proposed agreement impossible by removing one of the
persons whose consent would make it.""
It will be observed that this explanation assumes that there must
literally be a meeting of minds to make a contract. That assump-
tion is the rojot of the difficulty.
"If the formation of a contract required mutual mental assent
of the parties, and offer and acceptance were merely evidence of
such assent, it would be obviously impossible that a contract should
be formed where either party to the transaction died before the
assent was obtained. That such assent was formerly thought
necessary seems probable, and as to death at least this theory still
maintains itself."7
In the dead-offeror cases we seem to be plagued by an old con-
ception of "meeting of minds," which for most purposes has given
away to a more rational one.
A statement of the older conception is found in Household
Insurance Co. v. Grants where we read:
4Jordan v. Dobbins, (1877) 122 Mass. 168; Hyland v. Habich, (1889)
150 Mass. 112, 22 N. E. 765. Aitkin v. Lang, (1899) 21 Ky. L. Rep.
247, 51 S. W. 154.
5Garrett v. Traube, (1886) 82 Ala. 227, 3 So. 149; Davis v. Davis,
(1890) 93 Ala. 173, 9 So. 736; Bradbury v. Morgan, (1862) 31 L. J. Ex.
462, 1 H. & C. 249; Fennel v. McGuire, (1870) 21 U. C. C. P. 134; Dodd
v. Whelan, (1897) 1 Ir. R. 575; Knotts v. Butler, (1858) 10 Rich. Eq.
(S.C.) 143.
6Wald's Pollock on Contracts, p. 38.
71 Williston, Contracts, sec. 62.
8(1879) L. R. 4 Ex. Div. 216, 220.
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"The minds of the parties should be brought together at one
and the same moment'; that notion is practically the foundation of
the English law upon the subject of the formation of contracts."'
Clearly a contract could not be formed in accordance with that
doctrine after one of the parties making it had died. But we
know that contracts are frequently made at moments when the
offeror is unaware of it; indeed, that is generally the case when
acceptances are mailed at places remcte from the offeror.1° Con-
tracts are even made when offerors are positively unwilling to
make them and are doing their utmost to revoke their offers."
The actual state of the offeror's mind at the moment an acceptance
is made is of no importance.
The most essential factor in the formation of a contract obli-
gation seems to be an act (generally called a promise) whereby
the obligor has symbolized his will to come under the obligation.'"
Making an offer is such an act. The offeror always exacts some-
thing in exchange for his obligation and does not become bound
until that thing has been done or given. The contract obligation,
therefore, arises, if at all, after-and perhaps long after-the act
of offering has taken place.
Other explanations than the foregoing of the rationale of con-
tract obligations are common. According to Professor Holland:
"When the law enforces contracts, it does so to prevent disap-
pointment of well-founded expectations, which though they usually
arise from expressions truly representing intention, yet may occa-
sionally arise otherwise.'' 5
Dean Pound, Professor Oliphant and Sir Frederick Pollock also
emphasize that contract obligations arise from an endeavor to
prevent a promisee from being disappointed in the expectations
his promisor has aroused.14 It is sufficient for the present discus-
9
"It must, to constitute a contract, appear that the two minds were
at one, at the same moment of time." Dickenson v. Dodds, (1876) L. R.
2 Ch. Div. 463. See also note 2.
'
0Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 1 B. & Al. 681; Dunlop v. Higgins, (1848)
1 H. L. C. 381, 12 Jur. 295.
"Byrne & Co. v. Van Tienhoven, (1880) L. R.5 C. P. D. 344.
"-°Consideration and competent actors are assumed. See Ferson in 2
N. C. L Rev. 201, and 9 Cornell L. Q. 402.
'Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, 1st Am. Ed. star page 20.
14"The law of contract may be described as the endeavor of the
state, a more or less imperfect one by the nature of the case, to establish
a positive sanction for the expectation of good faith which has grown up
in the mutual dealings of men of average right-mindedness. Accordingly,
the most popular description of a contract that can be given is also the
most exact one, namely that it is a promise or set of promises, which the
law will enforce." Pollock, Principles of Contract, 2nd. Am. Ed., p. 1.
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sion to note that very few would contend that mutual and
synchronous mental assent is necessary to the formation of a con-
tract. "Meeting of the minds" no longer means that, although
the phrase still lingers in our books. It seems to be only the ghost
of a bygone conception that now points us to the rubric, "The
death of an offeror revokes the offer." The offer is not obliter-
ated by death of the offeror. It consists of an act which is an
accomplished fact and cannot be undone. Courts can refuse to
consider it but there is no logical necessity for them to do so, and
hardship sometimes results from such refusal.
The offer is not dead but the offeror is dead in the cases we are
discussing. It remains to consider what effect that fact may have
on the formation of a contract. The particular question is
whether the acceptance called for by the offer is possible without
the existence of the offeror. It must be borne in mind that any
one of a variety of performances, transfers, or promises may be
required to constitute an acceptance. The performance, transfer,
or promise may or may not involve the existence of a certain
person, e.g., the offeror. The non-existence of the offeror, accord-
ing to well-settled principles, renders some sorts of acceptances
impossible. It leaves other sorts possible. The cases may be
grouped into two classes: first, those where the acceptance called
for by the offer, and attempted by the offeree, consists of some-
thing that can be accomplished without the existence of the offeror;
and second, those where the acceptance called for consists of some-
thing which cannot be accomplished without the existence of the
offeror.
It may be supposed as an illustration of the first group of cases
that A offers to pay B $5 if B will saw a certain pile of wood
within a given time. A dies, but B, unaware of the death, saws
the wood within the time limit of the offer. A's existence is not
essential to that kind of performance. He is not a party to the
performance which constitutes acceptance. Another illustration
"There being no revocation, an offer will continue so long as the reas-
onable expectation which has been aroused in the mind of the offerec may
reasonably continue." Professor Oliphant in 18 Mich. L Rev. 205.
"The individual claims to have performance of advantageous promises
secured to him. He claims the satisfaction of expectations created by
promises and agreements .... Social interest in the security of trans-
actions, as one might call it, requires that we secure the individual interest
of the promisee, that is, his claim or demand to be assured in the ex-
pectation created, which has become a part of his substance." Dean
Pound, An introduction to the Philosophy of Law 236-7.
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of the same type of cases is found in this: A writes to B offering
to pay him $100 if B will transfer his horse Darby to X. 'Again
suppose A dies, but that B, unaware of the death, and within the
time limit of the offer, transfers Darby to X. The acceptance
consists of that transfer. A is no party to it, so his death should
not prevent it. It may be observed in passing that the death of
X would prevent it. In Garrett v. Trabu'e5 and Davis v. Davis,'8
the facts were that an agent of the offeror sent an order for goods
the day before the offeror died. The goods were to be shipped to
the agent and resold by him for his own profit. The offer was
accepted by shipment of the goods to the agent after the offeror
died. The estate of the offeror was held liable for the goods.
"When the order was posted the agent executed the authority
so far as requisite to a valid contract; and if the goods were
shipped by the plaintiff in pursuance of the order, within a reason-
able time, and in ignorance of the death of the principal, it became
a completed contract from the day when the order was deposited
in the mail, binding on the estate of the principal notwithstanding
it was not received by the plaintiffs until after her (the offeror's)
death."' 7
A number of cases have come before the courts where one
offered to guarantee the payment for such goods as might be
furnished by the offeree to another, and where the offeror has
died, but the offeree, unaware of the death, has furnished goods,
relying on the offer. It would seem, if the principles set forth
above are sound, that a contract was made in each case when the
goods were furnished, and that the offeree-acceptor should be
allowed to recover. Some of the decisions dealing with that situ-
ation so hold. 8 In other cases the courts have rigorously applied
25 (1886) 82 Ala. 227, 3 So. 149.
16(1890) 93 Ala. 173, 9 So. 736.
"7Garrett v. Traube, (1886) 82 Ala. 227, 3 So. 149.
'BBradbury v. Morgan, (1862) 31 L .J. Ex. 462, 1 H. & C. Rep. 249;
Fennel v. McGuire, (1870) 21 U. C. C. P. 134; Dodd v. Whelan, [1897] 1
Ir. Rep. 575; Knotts v. Butler, (1858) 10 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 143. In
Coulthard v. Clementson, (1879) L. R. 5 Q. B. 42, the offeree had notice
of the offeror's death. The decision does not, therefore, determine what
effect the death would have had in the absence of notice. The inference,
however, to be drawn from the language of Bowen, J., is that death
alone would not end the offer. He says: "I am of the opinion that the
notice with which the bank in the present case was affected amounted to
a discontinuance, so far as future advances were concerned, of the guar-
antee. A guarantee like the present is not a mere mandate or authority
revoked ipso facto by the death of the guarantor. The guarantee, it has
been said, is divisible as to each advance and ripens as to each advance
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the supposed rule that the death of an offeror revokes his offer,
and denied recovery."
The second group of cases may be illustrated by supposing that
A offers (his obligation) to pay $100 for (title to) B's horse
Darby. B's attempted acceptance of such an offer will consist of
his shipping Darby, or otherwise symbolizing his will to transfer
the title to A. But there is-if A has died-no transferee. The
situation here is like that in the well-known case of Cundy v.
Lindsay.2' In that case the seller of handkerchiefs was induced
by a fraudulent person to ship goods, with the purpose to pass
title, to the firm of Blenkiron & Sons. The fraudulent person
acquired possession, but as he was not the intended transferee the
title did not pass to him. Blenkiron & Sons had no knowledge
of the transaction and title did not pass to them. The attempt
to pass title failed for lack of a transferee. It was held that the
shipper, therefore, still owned the goods. The facts in the case
of In re Reed2 were similar, except that it does not appear that
the shipper's mistake was induced by fraud. The result was the
same, viz, the transfer failed for lack of a transferee. Those
cases appear to be in point in the present discussion. The con-
templated transferee is lacking as surely when he has died as
when he is ignorant of, and claims no connection with, the trans-
action. An offer which calls for a transfer to the offeror cannot
be accepted after the offeror has died.
2 2
into an irrevocable promise or guaranty only when the advance is made
... the guarantee could be legally determined at any time after the
guarantor's death by a proper notice to that effect."
19Jordan v. Dobbins, (1877) 122 Mass. 168; Hyland v. Habich. (1889)
150 Mass. 112, 22 N. E. 765; Aitkin v. Lang, (1899) 21 Ky. L. Rep.
247, 51 S. W. 154.
20(1878) 3 A. C. 459.
21(1875) L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 123.
The facts in Hardman v. Booth, (1863) 1 Hurlst. & C. 803, were that
the plaintiff who was the owner of goods attempted to pass title to Gandell
& Co. The possession of the goods was turned over to Gandell and Todd,
who pledged the goods to the defendant. It was held that no property
passed from the plaintiff and defendant was liable in trover. The court
emphasized that "there was no contract." Channel, B. said further, "There
is no doubt they were originally the plaintiffs' goods, and they must still
be theirs unless there has been a contract of sale to divest the property. It
is not suggested that there was a sale to Gandell & Co., and I do not think
there was a sale to Gandell and Todd, or either of them, so as to render a
repudiation of the contract by the plaintiffs necessary, for it is evident
that the plaintiffs believed that they were dealing with Gandell & Com-
pany and never meant to contract with Gandell and Todd."
22A contract, (not merely an offer) which calls for the transfer of a
title to an obligee can, of course, be performed after the original obligee
ha, died. The right he had passes to his heir or representative and the
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The second group of cases above referred to includes also the
cases where an offeree-acceptor attempts to assume a contract
obligation in favor of the offeror. This attempt fails, if the
offeror has died, for lack of the designated obligee. "It is a rule
of law that if a person intends to contract with A, B cannot give
himself any right under it. '23 Cases dealing with mistake, by the
promisor, as to the identity of the promisee are in point. In
Boston Ice Co. v. Potter24 the defendant had promised to buy ice
from the Citizens Ice Company. Plaintiffs afterwards bought out
the Citizens Ice Company and delivered ice to the defendant, with-
out notifying the defendant as to the change. The defendant was
held to be not liable.
"A party has the right to select and determine with whom he
will contract, and canfot have another person thrust upon him
without his consent. He may contract with whom he pleases, the
sufficiency of his reasons for doing so cannot be inquired into."' S
This principle would spare one, who had attempted to assume an
obligation to A, from having A's administrator thrust upon him
as the original obligee. The mistake on the part of the transferor
or promisor, as to the identity of the transferee or promisee, has
in some cases been induced by fraud. The rule applies, however.
where the mistake arises without any fraudulent conduct.2
If the obligee dies after a contract has been made, the obligor
must, of course, recognize his executor or administrator as a sub-
stituted obligee. In this situation the obligee, intended by the
obligor, existed when the obligation was created; and so the case
is entirely different from one where the contemplated obligee dies
before a contract is made. This substitution is permitted in order
to preserve-not to create-an obligation. There is a growing
tendency also to permit assignments of contract claims.2 - This
effects the substitution of another obligee for the original one.
Courts balked for more than a century before upholding assign-
performance consists in transferring the title to such heirs or representa-
tive. In this situation the transferee, contemplated at the time of the
transfer, exists.23Boulton v. Jones, (1857) 2 H. & N. 564.
24(1877) 123 Mass. 28, 25 Am. R. 9.
25Wernwag v. Phil. W. & B. Ry. Co., (1887) 117 Pa. St. 46, 11 Atd.
868; Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, (1887) 123 Mass. 28, 25 Am. Rep. 9:
Langdon v. Hughes, (1903) 113 Ill. App. 203; Roof v. Morrison Plummer
& Co.. (1890) 37 Ill. App. 37; Re Reed, (1875) L R. 3 Ch. D. 123.28in re Reed, (1876) L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 123; Roof v. Morrison, (1890)
37 Ill. App. 37.
27Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 816; 30
Harv. L Rev. 449.
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ments. They were deemed unfair to the obligor.2 8  It must be
emphasized that assignments, although now permitted, have noth-
ing to do with the creation of contract obligations. It is still
fundamental that an obligor may choose his original obligee.
29
The chief obstacle in the way of predicating a contract in the
second group of cases above is that a would-be acceptor does not
give the transfer or shoulder the obligation he intended to. The
transferee or obligee he contemplated, in attempting an aceeptance,
did not exist. This seems to be an end of the question in such
cases; a contract has not been made. The acceptance called for in an
offer may, on the other hand, be a performance which does not
involve the existence of the offeror and his death may leave the
acceptance possible to an offeree unaware of the death.
Another hindrance to the making of valid contracts, in dead-
offeror situations, appears when we consider what the acceptor
or would-be acceptor gets. The offeror generally proposes
to shoulder a duty in exchange for the acceptance; and
the acceptor assumes as a condition of his acceptance
that he is acquiring the right correlative to that duty.
This condition assumed by the acceptor does not exist
when the offeror has died; he does not get a right against
the offeror. The predication of a contract in this situation gives
the acceptor a right against the administrator or executor. The
acceptor thus gets something different from that which he bar-
gained for and would seem entitled to a privilege to rescind. The
suggested privilege of rescinding is, perhaps, merely academic;
because, in most situations where the acceptance consisted in an
accomplished performance, the acceptor would not want to
rescind, and, in cases where his attempted acceptance failed for
lack of a transferee or obligee, there is nothing to rescind.
It has been pointed out that acceptances of some kinds are
possible without the existence of the offeror. The recognition of
such acceptanices as effectual alters the relations of the offeror's
estate by divesting it of a title or imposing upon it an obligation.
Such changes in legal relations are as possible to the estate as they
28"A contract was conceived of as a strictly personal obligation. It was
as impossible for the obligee to substitute another in his place as it would
have been for him to change any other term of the obligation. This con-
ception, rather than the doctrine of maintenance, is the source of the
rule that a chose in action is not assignable." Ames, Lectures on Legal
History 258.2 9See notes 23, 24 and 25.
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would have been to the offeror had he lived. The offeror invited
the change; everything he exacted in his offer is acquired by the
estate when the acceptance is made; and there is nothing novel in
the idea of visiting the consequences of one's acts upon his estate.
The death of an offeror should not,-on grounds of either
expediency or logic-revoke the offer, as long as the offeree. is
unaware of the death. The acceptance of that offer may or may
not be possible, depending on what the offer demands for its
acceptance. . The acceptance called for may consist of a perfor-
mance, the transfer of a title, or the assumption of an obligation.
Whether an acceptance, completing the contract, is possible in the
particular case should depend on whether it involves the existence
of the offeror.
